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In this essay I review the main features of neoclassical growth theory, with an eye to seeing 
what it has to say about the causes of wealth and poverty among nations.  I argue that outside 
the OECD and a comparatively small circle of other countries, neoclassical models contribute 
little to identifying the deeper sources of cross-national patterns in growth and productivity.  I 
then discuss recent advances in the empirical analysis of economic performance that feature 
the influence of politics, policy and institutional arrangements on entrepreneurship, 
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I.   Introduction 
  International differences in economic prosperity are simply staggering.  Contemporary 
data show that per capita incomes in the most prosperous nations are more than thirty-fold 
higher than in the least prosperous.  And the gap between rich and poor evidently has grown 
during the last century and a half.  (See Pritchett (1997) and McGrattan and Schmitz (1999)).  
Convergence of living standards cross-nationally during recent decades has been confined 
largely to present members of the OECD and a comparatively small number of countries 
outside this charmed circle experiencing growth “miracles”.   
  One might think that economic growth and development would have occupied a 
prominent, if not dominant, position in the postwar research agenda of mainstream 
economics.  But until the late 1980s mainstream growth theory was a relatively small field 
that for the most part was detached from, and seemingly disinterested in, broad empirical 
trends in the wealth and poverty of nations.  Even today the revitalized field of formal growth 
theory is on the whole not squarely joined to empirical questions about why some countries 
are persistently poor, why others are persistently rich, and why a somewhat narrower group 
are in the process of catching up with the world’s productivity leaders -- poised to become 
rich themselves, maybe overtaking the countries now on top.  
  In this essay, which is based mainly on my lectures to first year graduate students in the 
economics program at Göteborg University, I review the main features of neoclassical growth 
theory, with an eye to seeing what it has to say about the causes of wealth and poverty among 
nations.  I then discuss recent developments in the empirical analysis of economic 
performance which feature the influence of politics, policy and institutional arrangements on 
entrepreneurship, innovation, investment and the efficiency with which factor inputs are 
transformed to output. 
II.   Neoclassical Economic Growth 
  The modern analysis of economic growth and development begins (and, for some, ends) 
with the neoclassical model of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).  The basic one-sector 
neoclassical production function models gross output,  Q, as a twice differentiable, 
homogenous of degree 1 function  ( ) F ￿  of physical capital, K, raw labor input, L, and the 
labor augmenting state of technology, A:     2
[ ] ()(),()() QtFKtAtLt = .  (1) 
Output is strictly concave in each argument, and increasing and jointly concave in all of its 
arguments;   ,0,,0 KLKKLL FFFF >< .   We need also to impose some innocuous 
conditions at input extremities (Ianada conditions);  limlim0 KL KL FF
ﬁ¥ﬁ¥ == , 
00 limlim KL KL FF
ﬁﬁ ==¥.  Technology and labor are assumed to grow exogenously.  The usual 
specifications are exponential:   ()(0),()(0)
gtnt AtAeLtLe == .  “Effective” labor input to 
production,  ()() AtLt , therefore grows at rate ( ) gn + .   
  The degree 1 homogeneity of production (constant returns to scale) allows the model to 
be expressed in so-called intensive form, with output per effective unit of labor driven by 
capital per effective unit of labor: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ,,1,1 QFKALALFKALALFkALfk ==￿=￿” Øø ºß   (2a) 
( ) qfk =   (2b) 
where  ( ) qQAL ” ,  ( ) / kKAL ”  and I drop time subscripts here and elsewhere when the 
meaning is plain.   
  Much of what can be learned from the standard neoclassical growth model stems from the 
first order differential equation for growth of capital per effective worker.  The stock of 









where d  is a fixed rate of capital depreciation and s is the constant exogenous share of output 
saved and invested.  Dividing (3) through by  AL and using the fact that 
( ) KALkngk =++
g
& ,
1 we find that capital per effective worker accumulates over time 
according to 
                                                 
1 The result follows from the time derivative for k: 
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  The implications of the standard neoclassical setup are so well known that one may run 
through them quickly.  The rate of output growth per effective worker is proportional to the 











where  SH a  is capital’s share of output, if capital commands its marginal product at every 
instant.  Output per worker holds greater practical interest, however, than output per 
“effective” worker.  Denote output per worker,  QL , as q % and capital per worker,  KL , as 
k %.  Since  qq
g
%%  is just qqg +
g
 and analogously for  kk
g
%% , the former evolves as 










  The curvature of the production function along with the Ianada conditions insure that 
there is a unique steady-state level of capital intensity,  k*, at which  0 k =
g
: 
( ) ( ) ** sfkgnk d =++ .  Hence at steady state, output and capital per worker grow at the 
rate of exogenous technological progress, independent of saving, depreciation and labor force 











III.   Neoclassical Steady State Income Differences 
  What about the steady-state level of income per worker?  To say more than 
( )
** , qFkA = % % , where  k % will be some function of A, s, n and g, we need to specify  ( ) F ￿ .  
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which case output per worker is 
1 qAk
aa - = % %  and steady-state capital per worker is   4
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Taking logs and indexing for the j-th economy yields an equation that has served as the 












￿￿ Øø ”=+￿+￿-++ ￿￿ ºß - Łł
% . 
(9) 
  Equation (9) implies that if production is well approximated by Cobb-Douglas and an 
economy is very near its steady-state level of capital formation, log output per worker 
depends on the exogenous state of technological progress and the difference between the log 
of the economy-specific saving rate and the log of the economy-specific labor force growth 
rate plus common rates of technological change and capital depreciation.  Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) show that equations estimated in the form of (9) can account for as much as 
60 percent of variation in log output per adult across a broad cross-section of countries.  But 
the implied share of output going to capital is too large.  Growth accounting strongly suggests 
that capital’s share of income is about a third ( 1/3 a » )
2;  Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s 
regression estimates of (9) implied a value around 0.6. 
  The same point can be illustrated from a different angle by application of (8) to 
contemporary data.  If we assume, as empirical studies based on (9) normally do, that the 
state of technology is a public good more or less freely available to all, and that capital 
depreciation rates and parameters of production do not vary significantly from one economy 
to the next, then international differences in output per worker are driven by saving rate 
differentials relative to differentials in labor force growth rates.  This is can be seen directly 
by using (8) to take the ratio of income per worker in “rich” and “poor” countries: 
                                                 





















  We can safely assume  ( ) g d + , measured on an annual basis, lies in the range 0.05 to 0.1 
and that population or labor force growth rates run as high as 0.04 per year in poor countries 
and as low as 0.0 in rich countries.  The poor-to-rich ratio of  ( ) ngd ++  on the right-side of 
(10) therefore should be no greater than 2.0.  The ratio of 1989 output per worker in the most 
and least productive 5 percent of the 137 countries in the Summers and Heston (1991) data is 
just over 30.  At  1/3 a = , this implies that saving rates in rich countries would have to be 
around 450 times higher than in poor countries in order to account for the development gap 
observed in late 1980’s data.  But at the extremes  richpoor ss has been calibrated to be at most 
about 30.  For representative clusters of rich and poor countries the measured ratios are more 
like 4.0 to 5.0.  Hence, conditioned on the standard estimate of returns to physical capital, the 
neoclassical model cannot plausibly account for international variations in prosperity if 
production is well approximated by a Cobb-Douglas function.  
  The stock of human capital – roughly speaking the market value of the labor force’s 
acquired skills -- may well exceed that of physical capital, at least in developed economies.  
(Kendrick, 1976)  And the international variations are likely to be large.  Even a crude 
measure of human capital  -- the average years of formal education of the workforce  -- 
exhibits cross-national differences on the order of 8 or 10 to 1.  (Jones (1998), Appendix B.)  
Moreover, returns to human capital probably exceed returns to physical capital.  (See, for 
example, Psacharopoulos (1985) and the discussion in Mankiw (1995).)  Broadening the 
concept of capital to include the stock of productive skills embodied in raw labor, and 
broadening the concept of saving to include the implicit costs of skill acquisition, amends the 
traditional neoclassical model in a way that allows it to deliver a more plausible account of 
international variations in prosperity.   
  The returns to all capital – physical plus human – are likely to be in the vicinity or 0.6 to 
0.8, as contrasted to a physical capital share commonly calibrated to be about 1/3.  At 
0.7 a = , equation (10) implies that saving rates need only vary from rich to poor countries   6
by a factor of 2.2 or so in order to generate a thirty-fold difference in average productivity.
3  
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) show that an augmented neoclassical model that includes a 
broad measure of capital is able to explain statistically around three-quarters of cross-national 
variation in levels of prosperity.  However, we are left with the question of why capital 
accumulation exhibits large international variation.  In this sense the key issue in economic 
development – why some countries are so rich and others so poor -- is just off-loaded to the 
issue of why we observe big differences in stocks of, and investment rates in, human and 
physical capital.   
  Making saving-consumption decisions endogenous, along the lines of the optimizing 
program of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) does not help at all.  Consider 
the standard set up in which identical households behave dynastically so as to maximize the 
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(11) 
where  c % is consumption per adult, n is the growth rate of adult members
4 and  0 r >  is the 
discount rate.   ( ) uc %  is assumed to be increasing and concave in consumption and it exhibits 
precisely the same properties as inputs to production in (1).  A convergent solution (satisfying 
transversality) requires that ( ) 0 n r -< .
5   
  The household’s optimization problem is constrained by an equation of motion for asset 
accumulation:  




where a denotes assets per member, w is the wage rate for a unit of labor inelastically 
supplied each period by each household member, and r is the market rate of interest.   
  Maximization of (11) subject to (12) yields the familiar first-order c ondition (Euler 
equation): 
                                                 
3 For related calculations drawn from empirical studies, see McGrattan and Schmitz (1999). 
4 The utility maximand therefore gives aggregate or ”social” utility and maps to aggregate 
consumption, saving and growth.  One could proceed with per person utility. 
5 Actually in this setup a convergent solution requires that  r  exceed the rate of population growth 
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The term in brackets is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (the reciprocal of the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution).  Households choose consumption per adult to equate 
the given market rate of interest to their rate of time preference plus the rate of decrease in 
marginal utility of consumption owing to growing consumption per adult.  A common 
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6.  The CIES specification is attractive, among other reasons, 
because it yields a simple, intuitively appealing first order condition for the optimal path of 
consumption per adult: 
1















Hence, the optimal time path of consumption is determined by the gap between the real return 
to saving and the rate of time preference, weighted by the  negative of the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution of consumption (the inverse of the negative of the elasticity of 
marginal utility).  For a given gap between  and r r, the higher is the propensity to substitute 
inter-temporally (the larger is s ), the larger is the response of consumption. 
  In the presence of technological progress (A), matters are best considered as before with 
variables expressed per effective worker.  At steady state,  0 k =
g
 and the capital stock per 
effective worker satisfies  ( ) ( )
** sfkgnk d =++ ; therefore  ( ) ( )
** sngkfk d =++ .  
Under Solow-Swan the saving rate is given exogenously; so equilibrium consumption falls 
                                                 
6 At  1 s = ,  ()ln ucc = %  by l’Hôptial’s rule.   8
out as  ( ) ( )
*** cfkngk d =-++ .
7  Equilibrium consumption in the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans program depends on parameters of utility and time preference.  Market 
competition delivers a cost of capital equal to capital’s marginal product;  
( ) ()() rtfkt d ¢ += .  Since ccccg =+
gg
%% , optimal consumption growth per effective adult is  




Equation (14c) shows that at steady state, saving and consumption rates in the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model must satisfy  ( ) ( )
* fkg rsd ¢ =++ .
8   
  If, as before, production is Cobb-Douglas, the ordinary differential equations for growth 
of capital and optimal consumption imply that the steady-state saving rate is 
( ) ( )
* sngg adrsd =++++ g .
9  Under this typical specification of the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans regime (CIES utility and Cobb-Douglas production), the productivity gap between 




















  The optimizing approach to saving and consumption is pleasing to work through because 
of its simplicity and elegance.  Yet endogenizing saving-consumption choices sheds no light 
on the deeper forces generating international differences in prosperity.  The mystery of why 
                                                 
7 Equilibrium consumption would be maximized at  ( ) ( )
* fkngd ¢ =++  -- the so-called Golden 
Rule level -- but there is no reason why the exogenous rate of saving would happen to take a value 
that created a steady-state capital stock satisfying this condition. 
8 Since  ( ) 0 fk ¢¢ <  (diminishing returns), steady-state saving will be lower and optimal consumption 
higher than what might be achieved at the Solow-Swan Golden Rule level of the capital stock, as long 
as  ()() gng rs +>+.  This condition must hold in a well posed optimization problem with 
bounded utility of consumption (satisfying transversality).   
9 Given that steady-state production is  ( )
*** qfkk
a
== , that  0 c = &  requires  
( ) ( )
* fkg drs ¢ =++  and that  0 k = &  requires  ( ) ( )
** sngkfk d =++ , the solution for 
* s  
follows. 
10 As earlier, technological progress, capital depreciation and parameters of production are taken to be 
common across economies.   9
saving differentials arise in the Solow-Swan setting are just transferred to the mystery of why 
rates of time preference and elasticities of inter-temporal substitution vary so much.  Equation 
(15) implies that international variations in prosperity hinge on household consumption and 
saving decisions in rich countries being driven by a comparatively low propensity to discount 
the future and by a comparatively high willingness to exploit investment opportunities by 
deferring current consumption in order to enjoy greater consumption later on.  Households in 
rich as compared to poor countries evidently have greater disposition to view the future with 
confidence.  Neoclassical theory says nothing about such disposition.  (Nor does it intend to.)  
This issue is joined directly, however, by political analyses of growth and development, 
which I discuss in section V. 
IV.   Neoclassical Convergence 
  The capacity of neoclassical theory to account for the vast international differences in 
prosperity were in the previous section evaluated in terms of steady-state incomes per head.  
Neoclassical theory makes clear predictions, however, about the path of output in route to 
steady state.  It can be shown
11 that taking a linear approximation of the neoclassical model in 
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Since  ( ) ln()ln()ln(0) qtTqtTAgtT +”+--+ % , and analogously for  ln() qt, equation 
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and that cumulative growth of productivity from  to ttT +  is 
( ) ( )
* ln()ln()1lnln()
T qtTqtCeqqt
b - +-=+-￿- %%%   (16c) 
where  ( ) ( ) 1ln(0)
T CeAgtgT
b - Øø =-￿+￿+￿ ºß .
12  From (16c) we see that the neoclassical 
model predicts that growth rates should be relatively high in economies that are relatively far 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 2 or Durlauf and Quah (1999). 
12 Note that taking T=1 and expressing (16c) for output per effective worker (so that C=0), yields a 
continuous time representation of the well known discrete time partial adjustment model:  
( ) ( )
*
1 lnlnlnln ttt qqqq l + -=- ,  with  ( ) 1 e
b l
- »- .   10 
from their steady states.
13   Output per worker approaches steady state at a rate that declines 
as the gap between 
*
lnq  and  ln q %  declines and that rises as the convergence parameter (or 
rate of technology transfer),  b , r ises.  In order to say more, the functional form of 
neoclassical production must be specified. 
  As mentioned already, the empirical workhorse is Cobb-Douglas, in which case 
cumulative growth of output per worker for given saving and labor force growth rates in the 
j-th economy would be  
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(17) 
where  ( ) ( ) 1 j ng bad =-￿++ .
14  Productivity growth over some period t to (t+T) therefore 
depends on a growth constant and a depreciation constant which are given exogenously 
( , g d ), on economy-specific population growth and saving rates ( , jj ns ), on common 
parameters of production (a ), and on the initial level of output per worker (ln() j qt % ).   
  Many empirical studies of international variations in growth rates are loosely based on an 
equation like (17).  Applied to data from the 1960s on growth rates of output per worker, the 
traditional neoclassical setup fares poorly in large international cross-sections if homogenous 
saving and labor force growth rates are maintained.  (In this case the product to the left of the 
minus sign within brackets on the right-side of (17) is just a constant.)  The implication is that 
there is little tendency for standards of living to converge to a common international steady-
state potential,  ln* j q  (unconditional or absolute  b -convergence).  However, 
notwithstanding occasional assertions to the contrary, the neoclassical model makes no 
prediction of homogenous cross-economy saving behavior, common steady-state potentials 
and universal convergence.  Specified with economy-specific saving and labor force growth 
rates, the model does tolerably well in fitting cross-national variation in postwar growth 
performance.  (Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) is an influential, early demonstration.)  Yet 
with  a equal to the stylized physical capital share of 1/3, and with  ( ) j ng d ++ equal to 
                                                 
13 This general idea appeared in the work of economic historians before the technical demonstrations 
of neoclassical models.  See, for example, Gershenkron (1952). 
14 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 2 supply a proof.   11 
about 0.08  per annum, the neoclassical model with Cobb-Douglas production predicts a 
conditional convergence rate of over 5 percent per year.  Empirically, 5 percent is much too 
high. 
  If the concept of capital is broadened, however, to include human as well as physical 
stocks, the conditional convergence prediction of neoclassical growth theory receives much 
better empirical support.  As I pointed out in section III, including human capital in the story 
increases the international variation in implied steady-state levels of capital and output, which 
are the “attractors” that help drive transitional growth rate dynamics.  And by raising the 
implied share of capital in gross income, a broader conception of saving lowers the speed at 
which convergence in a neoclassical setting is predicted to occur.  At an income share of, say, 
0.7 to 0.8 going to a broadened conception of capital, the implied rate of convergence for a 
human capital-augmented Cobb-Douglas production function ranges from to 1.5 to 2.5 
percent a year, which conforms well to results obtained by Barro (1991, 1995), Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992), and others. 
  Such results are rightly taken to supply evidence favoring the neoclassical model of 
growth.  Yet, as noted before, we are left with the question of why saving behavior exhibits 
large international variation.  In the Solow-Swan model saving rates are taken to be 
exogenous, while in the optimal consumption program of Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans saving is 
determined by exogenous discount rates and inter-temporal elasticities of substitution.  But 
willingness to save today in order to consume later on must surely depend upon anticipated 
returns to investment.  So expected growth influences saving rates or, equivalently, 
influences the parameters of utility and time preference that determine saving.  Under even 
weak forms of rational expectations, reverse causation from rationally expected growth to 
saving decisions creates doubt about what regressions including variable saving rates reveal 
about the sources of economic growth in general, or the dimensions and magnitudes of 
convergence in particular. 
  More persuasive are results from the path breaking studies of Barro (1991), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995 chapter 11) on economic growth across sub-national 
economies that plausibly have very similar steady states: American states, regions of the main 
European economies, and Japanese prefectures.  In this research convergence rates were   12 
estimated by regressing output growth rates on initial conditions alone,
15 imposing the 
assumption of common saving rates (and labor force growth rates).  Convergence at 
approximately 2 percent per annum was the typical estimate.
16  Convergence is also a strong 
feature of the results obtained at the level of national economies by Baumol (1986), Dowrick 
and Nguyen (1988), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Pritchett (1997), among others, for 
present members of the OECD.
17  These studies indicate that neoclassical mechanisms work 
as advertised in economies functioning within a political- institutional environment of the sort 
enjoyed by today’s rich countries.
18 
  By comparison to much of the rest of the world, however, OECD countries and their 
constituent administrative units are lands of unfettered market capitalism.  Nonetheless, even 
within  the OECD community the consequences of intrusions by politics, policy, and 
institutional arrangements on the presumptively efficient functioning of frictionless, 
impersonal market mechanisms are vigorously debated.
19  But relative to the great damage 
done to growth and standards of living by policies and institutional practices existing in many 
parts of the world, these debates amount to hairsplitting.  Outside the circle of nations with 
comparatively benign, market supporting institutional frameworks, unvarnished neoclassical 
models contribute little to understanding the sources of growth and productivity. 
V.   Political Sources of Growth and Development 
  The neoclassical ingredients for modeling growth and development are the scale of factor 
inputs  – raw labor, human capital and physical capital  – the saving-investment rates 
                                                 
15 Related regression experiments included controls for aggregate shocks and other structural variables 
most likely unrelated to saving behavior and exogenous with respect to growth. 
16 However, for reservations about the robustness of conditional estimates of convergence parameters 
see Durlauf and Quah (1999). 
17 Dowrick and Nguyen, however, interpret the negative effect of initial condition output on growth to 
represent the speed of technological diffusion across countries, rather than the degree of decreasing 
returns to reproducible factors.  In such regressions one cannot distinguish the two forces, which may 
well be jointly at work. 
18 Reverse causation issues arise also here, though perhaps in weaker form than with respect to 
connections among institutional conditions and productivity levels.  (See the remarks in section V.)  
Yet the natural experiments supplied by the historical experiences of North and South Korea, Mao’s 
China and Hong Kong, communist East and capitalist West Germany, or Eastern Europe altogether 
during and after the breakup of the Soviet bloc system, leave little doubt that political-institutional 
conditions exert strong effects on national economic performance. 
19 Agell, Lundh and Ohlsson (1997) supplies an excellent review and fresh empirical results focusing 
on the effects on growth of the scale of fiscal activity.   13 
determining the speed at which capital accumulates to steady state, the efficiency with which 
factor inputs produce output (parameters of production), and the initial endowment of 
technological knowledge and its rate of growth.  If the traditional model is re-specified to 
incorporate human capital, and if exogenous saving rates are permitted to vary freely across 
economies, the evidence cited previously shows that neoclassical equations a re able to 
account statistically for a substantial part of the variation in average levels of productivity and 
are reasonably successful in tracking variation in average rates of growth.  Successful 
economies are those with high rates of saving and investment in plant, equipment, training 
and education.  Yet, as already emphasized, this conclusion shifts the central question of why 
some nations are rich and others poor to the puzzle of why saving and investment behavior 
varies so much. 
  Endogenous growth theory addresses this issue by explicitly modeling investment 
decisions and the process of capital formation.
20  Endogenous growth models typically 
predict permanent growth rate responses to changes in investment, research and development 
and various policy variables affecting accumulation of human and physical capital.  However, 
growth rates do not seem to be permanently affected by increased research and development 
and exhibit little or no persistence.  (See, for example, Jones (1995a, 1995b).)  Moreover as 
Mancur Olson (1996) pointed out, neither endogenous growth theory nor neoclassical growth 
theory are able to account for the stylized fact that the highest rates of growth rate tend to 
occur in a subset of low income countries, rather than low income countries in general as 
implied by neoclassical transitional dynamics, or in high income countries with well 
developed research and development sectors and high levels of education and training, as 
claimed by most endogenous growth models.  The initial excitement about endogenous 
growth theory has largely dissipated in the light of its failure to overcome the empirical 
deficiencies of neoclassical theory. 
  Empirical research on growth and development has responded  to the shortcomings of 
received theory by first building upon, and more recently by discarding almost completely, 
the standard modeling architecture.  The first breakthroughs in understanding observed 
patterns of growth and development came via the “politicization” of neoclassical models.  
Politicized neoclassical growth theory emphasizes that the stocks of labor and capital 
                                                 
20 The best overview of endogenous growth theory is Aghion and Howitt (1997).   14 
available for production, as well as the efficiency with which factor inputs are transformed to 
output, depend decisively on how politics, policy and institutional arrangements affect the 
security of property and private returns to entrepreneurship, innovation, investment and hard 
work.  Saving behavior, and rates of time preference and intertemporal substitution of 
consumption  – the prime movers in neoclassical models  – are viewed  as intermediate 
variables driving growth and development which themselves are determined by the political 
and institutional environment.  
  The principal contribution of politicized growth theory, however, is methodological.  The 
main substantive message appeared long ago in North and Thomas’s (1973) seminal 
historical analysis of the critical role played by the institutionalization of private property 
rights to the emergence of prosperity in the West.  (See also North (1981, 1990).)  The 
novelty of the research undertaken during the last decade lies in the application of routine 
econometric methods to large international data sets containing improved measures of output 
and systematic, albeit crude, calibrations of political-institutional conditions.  A flood of 
recent of empirical research has investigated the statistical response of growth and 
development to a great number of unconventional sociopolitical, policy and institutional 
variables.
21  By my reading of the literature, the most robust “outside” determinants of 
growth and development are the political-institutional indicators reported in the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), prepared for fee-paying clients by Political Risk Services of 
Syracuse, New York.
 22  
  The ICRG variables consist of subjective scores on five aspects of politics, policy and 
institutions relevant to the security of property rights in various countries and periods:  (i) the 
political autonomy and expertise of the public bureaucracy, (ii) the degree to which the ‘rule 
of law’ is institutionalized, (iii) the extent of government corruption, (iv) the risk of 
                                                 
21 If ‘politicized’ growth regressions are conditioned on the investment rate, as in Levine and Renelt 
(1992), few outside variables register significant effects .  This is to be expected, however, since much 
of the influence of politics, policy and institutions operates through investment behavior.  In fact, 
many of the econometric studies mentioned in this essay investigated the response of investment to 
the same variables included in growth equations, and typically obtained parallel results. 
22 Durlauf and Quah (1999), Table 2 provide a concise summary of dozens of papers that include 36 
different categories of test variables.  Sala-i-Martin (1997) took matters quite a few steps further by 
running himself nearly two million regressions to test the robustness of effects of combinations of 62 
test variables.  He found, as did many other studies discussed later in the main text, strong growth 
effects from the ICRG variables; in particular the ‘rule of law’ variable listed below.   15 
expropriation or nationalization of property and (v) the risk of government repudiation of 
contracts.  Several strategies have been employed to investigate the effects of these and many 
other measures of political and institutional conditions on growth and development.  
  One approach, taken for example by Olson, Sarna and Swamy (2000), applies growth 
accounting to the traditional neoclassical model in order to identify country-specific 
determinants of the “Solow residual” (total factor productivity).
23  Differentiating the 
neoclassical production function in (1) with respect to time for  j-th economy, and then 















.  Olson et. al. implicitly adopt the 
common (and I think highly unrealistic) assumption that the elasticities  K a  and  L a  are 
constant over j and t.  They assumed also that the total factor productivity residual can be 
partitioned into country-specific productivity effects,  () Rj and random shocks,  () rjt , with 
the former supplying the main channel by which politics, policy and institutions affect 
economic growth.  The country-specific component of the growth accounting residual was 
obtained from a first-stage estimation of a discrete time representation of (18) for a pooled 
cross-section of time series covering 68 counties over the period 1960-87.  The first first-
stage regression equation is  
( ) ( ) ( ) 111 lnlnln jtjtjKjtjtLjtjtjt QQRKKLLr aa --- =+++  .  (19) 
In this approach, fixed country effects derived from an equation like (19) are then analyzed in 
second-stage regressions of the form 
jjj RaXbe =++   (20) 
where X denotes variables for political-institutional conditions and other controls, which in 
the Olson, Sarna and Swamy study included initial condition per capita income.  
                                                 
23 The term ‘total factor productivity’ is firmly lodged in the jargon of economics, but as Abramovtiz 
(1956) famously observed, the growth accounting residual is more accurately (and less pretentiously) 
viewed as “a measure of our ignorance.”    16 
  Regression experiments based on (20) produced strong statistical evidence that the ICRG 
measures of institutional quality exert large effects on international variations in country-
specific total factor productivity.  For example, Olson et. al. estimated that a composite 
“quality of governance” measure constructed from the five constituent ICRG variables had a 
growth effect of 0.27.  The composite ICRG variable ranged internationally from 1.7 (Haiti) 
to 9.8 (Hong Kong).  The implication is that this crude measure of the quality of the political 
environment can account for international differences in growth rates of as much as 2.2 
percent per year.  The growth effects of politics and institutions estimated by Olson, Sarna 
and Swamy are therefore substantial.  Nonetheless, they are almost certainly understated, and 
perhaps by a large margin. 
  In the growth accounting approach, the stock and flow of factor inputs are determined 
exogenously and parameters of production are a ssumed constant over all countries and 
periods.  Yet if policy, politics and institutions affect directly the process of capital formation, 
the quality of labor inputs and the efficiency with which given factor inputs are transformed 
into value added, then the two-stage, growth accounting method of analysis will miss 
important channels of political influence on growth performance.  The record of the 
command economies of the former Soviet Union and its East European clients provides an 
obvious illustration.  The Soviet-bloc economies were distinguished by relatively high labor 
force participation rates, high levels of education, and high rates of (forced) saving and 
investment, which produced seemingly impressive stocks of physical capital.  Yet these 
ample h uman and physical resources were deployed inefficiently and living standards 
stagnated.  The reason of course is that command economies lack a system of relative market 
prices to guide the allocation of factor inputs, and offer few private returns to productive 
work effort and efficient management practice.  Clearly parameters of production and 
associated marginal productivities cannot sensibly be held fixed across economies burdened 
with institutional arrangements that create large gaps between factor productivities and factor 
rewards.  
  Moreover, saving flows and accumulated asset stocks may be inefficiently transformed to 
additional output because of deficient demarcation and protection of property rights.  As 
Hernando de Soto (2000) forcefully points out, accumulated capital will be incompletely 
utilized, or not utilized at all, if rights of ownership are not clearly established and impartially   17 
enforced.  The problem in much of the third world, according to de Soto, is not a shortage of 
accumulated saving; rather it is that a great share of assets is illiquid and static.  Property is 
inadequately documented and hence lacks a status freeing it to produce additional value.  
Because property is insufficiently “paperized” by enforceable legal representations, it cannot 
be used as a share against investment or as collateral for loans that can raise the stock of 
working capital.  The “transformation potential” of stagnant assets to active capital depends 
critically on the institutional status of rights to property.  The effects of the institutional 
environment on growth and development therefore cannot be accurately assessed by taking 
factor inputs as given, or by assuming that the effectiveness with which potential factor 
inputs are transformed to output is unaffected by the institutional conditions.  
  The methodological problems with research based on growth accounting are largely 
overcome by a more widely used approach popularized by Robert Barro’s influential 1991 
article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Barro (1991)).  Research undertaken using 
Barro’s basic setup essentially operates with a discrete time representation of (16c) to 
estimate determinates of potential steady-state output per effective worker, 
* ln j q .  The 
equations behind this line of research are 
* lnlnlnln jtTjtjtj qqCqq ll + ¢ -=-+ %%%   (21a) 
*
()() ln jtjt qaXb =+   (21b) 
which yields an estimating equation for growth of output per worker 
() lnlnln jtTjtjtjt qqcqXb ll + -=-+￿ %%%  (21c) 
where  ( ) ln(0) CAgtgT l ¢ =￿+￿+￿ Øø ºß ,   ( ) cCa l ¢ =+,   () jt X  is a vector of variables 
determining variation in potential steady-state output (capital), and parentheses around the 
time subscripts indicate differences across studies about whether  ln* q  was  modeled as 
varying over time as well as countries.
24  Notice that this test equation, which is the basic 
empirical setup used in dozens of studies, is unconstrained as to its arguments and 
relationships among its parameters.  The only vestige of formal neoclassical theory is the 
                                                 
24 Although the dependent variable in (21c) is cumulative growth of productivity, many studies use 
average growth rates observed across countries over one or more time ranges.  In this case coefficients 
are just divided by T, the length of the accumulation period.   18 
free-form coefficient l  on the initial condition level of output per worker, which should have 
a negative sign under the theoretical prediction of decreasing returns to reproducible 
factors.
25  
  Barro’s initial research used calibrations of political violence and simple coding of 
“socialism” to measure the sociopolitical and institutional conditions that might affect the 
potential steady-state levels of capital and output driving transitional growth rates.
26  After 
the appearance of important papers by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Knack (1996), however, 
Barro and others adopted the ICRG measures.  (See, for example, Barro (1997).)  Knack and 
Keefer’s research showed that the ICRG indicators of political-institutional conditions do a 
better job of explaining international variations in growth than alternative calibrations.  Their 
results, based on average growth in GDP per capita during 1974-1989 in 98 countries, 
implied that a shift from one extreme to the other in the average of all five ICRG indicators 
produces a corresponding shift of 4 percent per annum in the average rate of economic 
growth.  This result is substantially higher than the 2.2 percent per annum upper limit effect 
obtained by Olson, Sarna and Swamy (2000), which is consistent with my earlier remarks 
about the likelihood of the growth accounting approach understating the magnitude of 
institutional effects on economic performance.  Many other studies have reinforced the 
results first reported by Knack and Keefer for output growth.
27.  Moreover, the main message 
of this research applies with equal, or even greater, force to levels of prosperity. 
  The most recent research on political sources of economic performance has shifted from 
the study of growth rates to analysis of productivity levels.  One important reason is that in 
the neoclassical empirical framework popularized by Barro (1991), differences in growth 
rates are transitory.  If the determinants of steady-state income (capital) are stable, the 
dynamics of the model eventually drive all countries to converge to their own steady-state 
levels of income.  Growth of incomes everywhere then reverts to the same exogenously given 
                                                 
25 An alternative, though not exclusive, interpretation is that economies with low initial condition 
levels are able to catch-up with the technology leaders by adopting at low cost best practice 
technologies developed elsewhere.  See Abramovitz (1986). 
26 However, it is likely that political violence and instability and economic growth and development 
are jointly endogenous.  (The same is of course true of other political variables.)  Hibbs (1973) 
undertook perhaps the first econometric analysis of the potential two-way causation between 
economic performance and mass political violence, with primary emphasis placed on determinants of 
international variations in the later.   
27 For example, Rodrik (1997), Sachs and Warner (1997) and, as already noted, Sala-i-Martin (1997).   19 
rate of technological progress.  In fact, growth rates exhibit little persistence within countries 
over time, so cross-national differences are most likely quite transitory.  International 
variation in levels of prosperity therefore supply a more secure empirical base from which to 
identify the impact of policies and institutions on economic performance.  And income levels 
register directly international differences in living standards.
28 
  Two leading examples of the recent focus on political models of output levels per head 
are Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000).  These and similar 
papers posit reduced form equations representing the straightforward idea that politics, policy 
and institutions are what determine the scale of factor inputs and their efficiency in producing 
value added.  Illustrated schematically the model entertained is simply: 
 
Politics, Policies, Institutions  ￿  Factor Inputs, Marginal Productivities  ￿  Output 
 
The regression equation fit to data on a large cross-section of countries in the Hall and Jones 
and Acemoglu et al. studies is therefore 
( ) ln jjJ j QLPIZ abge =+++   (22) 
where  ( ) QL denotes output per worker or per person, PI denotes politics, policies and 
institutions and Z is a vector of additional control variables.  Equation (22) represents quite a 
transformation of thinking in the economics profession about the sources of wealth and 
poverty among nations.  It bears no traces at all of received theories of growth, and it is 
indistinguishable from the loosely motivated regression equations long populating sociology 
                                                 
28 Regression models in the form of (21c) of course can be solved for the implicit time path of 
productivity levels, either by simulation or, if the driving variables are stable, by direct computation.  
For convenience, take T = 1 and evaluate (21c) from period t = 0 forward.  If  () jt X  are fixed at some 
stable value, say  j X , the solution for  1 ln jt q + %  would be:  













Øø =-+--￿++￿-- ºß ￿ %% , 
where  ( ) 0 *ln caAg l =++.  The last term in the equation represents the accumulated effect on 
log productivity of the trend growth of technological progress.   20 
and political science --  disciplines that historically were not tied to a tight theoretical system 
analogous to the reigning neoclassical paradigm of academic economics.
29 
  Attention is centered on the effects of policies and institutions, that is on estimates of  b .  
Hall and Jones measure PI (they call it Social Infrastructure) with the average of the five 
ICRG indicators described previously plus Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index of the openness 
of countries to free trade.  Their results imply that PI accounts for more than seventy percent 
of the thirty-five fold factor of variation in output per worker observed across 127 countries.  
The PI variable used by Acemoglu et al. is just the ICRG indicator of expropriation risk.  
They find that the expropriation risk variable by itself can account statistically for around half 
of the difference in income per capita across countries.  It has not gone unrecognized that 
political and institutional arrangements do not appear randomly, but have their own historical 
origins.
30  Drawing on historical scholarship, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, for example, 
present an extended analysis of the colonial origins of present day institutions.   
  As in the case of saving rates and economic growth, reverse causation is an important 
problem in estimation of political models of productivity, if only because rich countries have 
the resources to build institutions of high quality.
31   Researchers have struggled with the 
problem of simultaneity bias, and various instrumental variables estimators have been 
devised to obtain consistent estimates of the proximate effects of politics and institutions on 
economic performance.  Although I find none of the i nstrumental variables approaches 
proposed thus far to be entirely persuasive, the evidence nonetheless strongly suggests that 
                                                 
29 Ironically, as research by economists on growth and development and other topics has begun to 
discard formal theory in favor of a more institutionally grounded, empirical approach, political 
science has moved in the direction of traditional economics, with a growing fraction of research 
lodged in the a-institutional constrained optimization paradigm of microeconomic theory.  
30 Olson and Hibbs (2000) develop a model in which biogeographic conditions existing at the time of 
the Neolithic transition about eleven thousand years ago affect present day prosperity, as well as its 
more proximate institutional determinants. 
31  The related idea that a relatively high level of economic development (and perhaps also 
distributions of wealth and income that are not too inequitable) are prerequisites for  democratic 
political development (conceived in terms of  competitive politics, the rule of law, security of property 
rights and individual liberties, and so forth) can be traced back in the modern social science literature 
at least to Lipset (1959).  Lipset (1981, chapter 14) comments on the more systematic quantitative 
investigations of the economic development-to-political-democracy thesis that were undertaken in the 
1960s and early 1970s by Cutright, Olsen, McCrone and Cnudde, Winham, Diamond, among other 
political sociologists and political scientists.  Here, as in other lines of recent research on connections 
among politics and institutions and economic growth and development, economists are beginning to 
replicate and extend the earlier work of political soci ologists and political scientists.   21 
productivity and growth are to a large extent explained by politics, policy and institutions, 
rather than by economically endogenous processes of capital formation, or by exogenous 
variation in saving behavior and associated parameters of time preference and utility.  Indeed, 
it is remarkable how potent the effects of political conditions on economic performance 
appear to be despite the rudimentary status of measurement.  Understanding of the sources of 
wealth and poverty among nations would surely be advanced significantly if ‘political-
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